There is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of national governments are dependent on choices made by governments in other countries. We argue that while the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition, in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear. In this paper we build a model of social learning with a specific application to corporate tax competition across countries. This model yields predictions that are differentiable from existing models of tax competition. Specifically, we argue that social learning is most likely to take place in the wake of tax policy cuts by left governments. We test this model using an existing data set of corporate tax rate changes and an author-created data set of changes in tax legislation, covering twenty OECD countries from 1980-1998. 
Introduction and Motivation
There is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how (policy) choices of national governments are interdependent. Countries' trade policy decisions are often conditional on the tariff rates and level of subsidies of other countries. Scholars of monetary policy have often lamented periods of "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies where countries use currency devaluations to gain advantages over their trading partners. Neo-liberal economic reforms, including privatization and pension reform, spread across countries in waves.
In this paper, we directly address the growing literature on policy competition in the area of corporate taxation. Both domestically and internationally, corporate tax policy has emerged as a contentious issue. Domestically, traditional supporters of corporate tax policy reductions on the right have in many cases been joined by the left in pushing for corporate tax reduction as a mechanism for job creation. In some cases, this is directly in response to corporate tax policy elsewhere in the world, for example, when corporate tax reductions in the United States under President Reagan seemingly triggered major tax reductions around the world.
We argue that while the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition, in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear. In the context of corporate tax policy, numerous scholars label the temporal clusters of tax policy cuts as evidence for tax policy competition. Yet, we believe that a number of potential theoretical mechanisms could explain this relationship. Empirically, we argue that the predictions generated by studies of corporate tax policy competition are in many cases observationally equivalent to models of social learning.
In this paper, we build a model of social learning and contrast it with existing models of corporate tax competition. The model provides us with comparative statics that allow us to empirically differentiate our explanation for clustered tax policy cuts from existing models of tax policy competition. Specifically, while models of tax policy competition focus on the role of large countries or competitors for investment as triggers of tax policy diffusion, we focus on the potential for learning, when a government with long-held preferences for higher corporate taxes (left governments) legislates corporate tax reductions. As a result, our social learning model yields empirical predictions that are clearly distinguishable from existing models of tax competition. We test the model using an existing data set of tax policy rates from Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) and a unique, author-created data set on the timing of tax policy cuts in twenty OECD countries from 1980-1998. Our empirical results point to the importance of social learning in the diffusion of corporate tax policy. Specifically, we find that tax cuts by left governments lead to changes in the tax policies of other governments.
This project makes two major contributions to political science scholarship. First, it directly addresses the determinants of corporate tax policy cuts in the OECD. Contrary to existing studies that mostly link corporate tax reductions to tax competition, we find evidence consistent with social learning. Second, this paper makes a broader contribution to literatures in international relations and comparative politics. We outline a number of important substantive debates in international political economy and comparative politics that could apply and empirically test theories of learning, emulation and innovation, which traditionally have been under-utilized in political science.
Diffusion, Learning and Competition in the Global Economy
There is a growing recognition that the actions of one actor affect the actions of other actors, whether these are sub-national actors (e.g., states, provinces, etc.), groups within a society (e.g., political parties, insurgent military groups, etc.) or nation-states. 1 Specifically, studies of how policy and preferences diffuse across borders have become an important part of the scholarship in political science (for a review, see Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006) . As pointed out by Elkins and Simmons, "since 1950, fifteen to twenty titles with diffusion appear each decade until the 1990s, when the number spikes to thirty-seven" (Elkins and Simmons, 2005, p. 36) . While numerous research projects across different subfields have studied diffusion, we focus on reviewing the literature in international and comparative political economy, with a specific focus on corporate 1 See Knill (2005) for a review of policy convergence in the European Union, Gilardi (2005) on the diffusion of independent regulatory agencies and Meseguer (2005) for an excellent discussion of diffusion and rational learning in regulatory policies. tax policy making in the OECD.
Terms such as diffusion, learning, competition and imitation are often used in political science, yet often the exact meaning of these concepts is either not defined or consistent with a number of different concepts. Recent contributions have made progress in refining these concepts, such as Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006) , who differentiate between coercion, competitive pressures from market forces, policy learning and social emulation. 2 Quinn and Toyoda (2007) examine how domestic and international factors affect changes in international capital account regulation. Volden, Ting and Carpenter (2008) build theoretical models that allow us to differentiate between situations in which governments learn from their own experiences and those where governments learn from the experiences of other governments. We argue that even with the advances in the diffusion literature, there is considerable room for both refinement and theory building, in order to improve on empirically differentiating between different forms of diffusion.
To give one example, research on the spread of neo-liberal reforms across countries, including the privatization of state-run enterprises, has considered diffusion as an important component of these policy reforms (see Meseguer, 2004) . 3 If one examines the data on privatization, there is a clear pattern of temporally clustered privatization across countries, with waves of Eastern European and Latin American countries engaging in privatization at the same time. One argument is that these countries could all be subject to common external shocks, such as budget crises or the collapse of to international institutions (e.g., WTO, EU, etc.). 5 Thus, these patterns of privatization may be closer to what we would label as coercion than diffusion. 6 Second, there have been major shifts in the views of economists on the proper way of regulating the economy, so that these similar policy changes across countries could be the result of Chicago-trained economists and the Washington Consensus (see Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003) .
Another example is the interdependence of exchange rate policies across countries. While there is a sizeable literature on the domestic factors that affect exchange rates, there is also evidence that competitive dynamics influence exchange rate policies. 7 One simple argument is that exchange rates affect trade flows, in that devaluations by other countries affect the prices of imports and exports. In periods of "beggar-thy-neighbor" exchange rate cuts, countries engage in exchange rate devaluation in response to devaluations by other countries (see Eichengreen, 1996 ).
Yet, there are also changes in exchange rate choices that seem to be independent of this competitive dynamic and instead based on learning from other countries. Some examples include the spread of independent central banks, fixed exchange rates or currency boards. 8 Without going into the details of these arrangements, there is considerable evidence that these major policy changes were spread through the diffusion of knowledge across countries. 9
More generally, we can say that in many areas of international and comparative political econ-5 See Vreeland (2003) for a nuanced view on IMF conditionality. See Brune, Garrett and Kogut (2004) for an examination of how IMF conditionality influences the prices investors are willing to pay for privatized assets and Nooruddin and Simmons (2006) on the constraining impact of IMF programs on domestic spending choices.
6 See Drezner (2005) for a model of how the actions of great powers affect the probability of policy convergence.
7 For selected studies on the political economy of exchange rates and monetary policy, see Simmons (1994) , Bernhard and Leblang (1999) , Bernhard and Leblang (2006) , Bernhard, Broz and Clark (2002) , Frieden (1991) , Frieden (2002) and Bearce (2007) .
8 See Frieden and Stein (2001) for an excellent review of exchange rate policy in Latin America.
9 There is also a rich literature on the diffusion of financial crises. See, for instance, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) . omy research has shown temporally or spatially clustered policy changes, yet this empirical regularity is consistent with models of learning, competition or diffusion. While we know that "international" factors influence the decisions of policy makers, we are still left with considerable gaps in our understanding of the exact mechanisms underpinning this diffusion. Does globalization "force" governments into policy change or does it allow governments to learn best practices from other governments, resulting in better domestic policy decisions? 10
In this paper we address an important substantive question on the setting of corporate tax rates.
Some scholars have argued for a "race to the bottom" in corporate tax rates (see Andrews, 1994; Cerny, 1990; Kurzer, 1993) . A race to the bottom could lead to social tension, as citizens demand higher levels of social protection at a time when the government is the most fiscally constrained to provide these protections (see Rodrik, 1997) . Recent scholarship has provided a much more nuanced view of tax "competition" across countries. Three prominent studies are worth mentioning.
First, Swank and Steimo (2002) identify major adjustments in the levels of statutory corporate tax rates, where numerous countries slashed corporate tax rates in the wake of major tax cuts in the United States in 1986 (see also Swank, 2006) . According to Swank and Steimo, despite the fact that these tax cuts were the result of competition over mobile capital with the U.S., most countries, while lowering tax rates, also eliminated numerous industry and firm specific exemptions from taxes. Thus, while corporate tax rates fell, more firms were subject to corporate taxes. As a result, rate reductions had little impact on the revenues generated through corporate taxation.
Although the statutory tax rates have decreased, there has been a "remarkable stability in the levels and distribution of tax burdens" (Swank and Steimo, 2002, p. 642) . Hays (2003) examines the convergence of corporate tax rates in the OECD. He builds a theoretical model of corporate tax rate decisions in which competition for capital can lead to tax convergence. Yet, the simplistic view of tax policy as a race to the bottom is misguided. Hays finds that the majoritarian, liberal democracies are the countries most affected by the competition for international capital. Hays's work provides an excellent theoretical exploration of how domestic political institutions mitigate the effects of tax competition.
10 These questions are quite similar to debates on the relationship between federalism and governance (Oates, 1999) .
Finally, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) present an influential article on corporate tax competition. They develop a tournament model of competition in which countries bid against other countries for investment. They argue that the tax rate determinants are greatly influenced by domestic politics, including levels of partisanship and veto players, which can limit tax policy cuts.
Empirically, they find strong evidence for corporate tax competition, yet domestic political factors still heavily influence policy choices.
While we believe that these studies all provide important insights into tax policy competition, important elements remain unexplored. In this project we make a number of explicit assumptions that allow us to differentiate learning from these models of corporate tax competition. The first of these assumptions is rather uncontroversial and one that is common in the literature. We assume that it is more politically costly for left governments to cut corporate taxes (see for example Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004) . Ceteris paribus, we would be more likely to observe tax cuts by right governments than governments of the left.
A second assumption, less common in the literature, is that governments are operating in an environment of imperfect information with regard to the elasticity of capital to taxes. 11 In other words, politicians have imperfect information on how investment will fluctuate with changes in corporate taxation. We argue that while governments may know that reductions in taxation will increase capital flows, there is uncertainty on the exact magnitude of these responses. We believe that this is a realistic assumption, which is supported by both theoretical and empirical studies of investment responses to taxation. In the following paragraph we briefly review this literature.
Theoretically, while many scholars make the assumption that investors simply respond to after tax rates of return, the literature on the determinants of multinational investment decisions (foreign direct investment or FDI) is much more complicated. These multinational investors behave quite differently from other forms of capital (Hymer, 1976) , in that this type of investment is a response to market failures, different industry level factors or firm-specific reasons for making in-11 While the elasticity of capital to taxation is negative, in our discussion of the models we refer to the elasticity of capital to tax reductions. Thus we expect a positive elasticity between tax reductions and capital inflows. vestments. 12 Providing another level of complication, non-economic factors can also greatly affect foreign investment decisions. A recent article by Kiymaz and Taylor makes an explicit assumption of uncertainty, according to which "hosts cannot be sure of how much to offer the firm to locate in its borders, largely because it cannot precisely estimate the political, social, and cultural costs that the firm would face in foreign production" (Kiymaz and Taylor, 2000, p. 55) . Consquently, the simple assumption of capital flowing to the countries with the highest after tax rate of return is not supported by the theoretical literature on foreign direct investment.
Equally problematic for the assumption of perfect information on the elasticity of capital are the complex findings of the empirical literature linking taxation and foreign direct investment (see Jensen, 2006) . Numerous scholars in the economics and management literatures have found that corporate tax rates can impact certain types of investment decisions (e.g. in manufacturing). In a comprehensive review of the literature, Hines (1999) explores the time-series and cross-sectional analyses of the importance of tax rates for U.S. FDI outflows and foreign flows of FDI into the U.S.
While several studies reviewed by Hines find that taxes are not significant determinants of FDI inflows or outflows, a number of other studies find that national tax rates do have a substantial influence on FDI inflows, with elasticities ranging from −0.6 to −2.8. 13 Devereux and Griffith (1998) find that average effective tax rates are an important determinant of FDI decisions. In one of the more recent and most comprehensive studies, Mutti (2003) finds that corporate tax rates have a strong influence on the decisions of manufacturing multinationals. According to his findings, a 1% decrease in the cost of capital leads to a 3% increase in MNE production. The catch is, as Mutti states it, that "such a high response does not apply if the output is destined for local markets, or if the country has high per capita income" (Mutti, 2003, p. 5) . Thus, there remains considerable disagreement on the impact of taxes on foreign direct investment (see De Mooij and 12 Many of the models based on market imperfections find that tax rates are a minor determinant of FDI inflows (Markusen, 1995) . 13 Altshuler, Grubert and Newton (2001) estimate the effect of tax rates on U.S. manufacturing investment in 1984 and 1992. They find that tax rates have a significant effect on multinational investments, and that this relationship has grown stronger over time (with an elasticity of 1.5 in 1984 and an elasticity of 3.0 in 1992).
Ederveen, 2003).
Theoretically, this uncertainty could lead governments to "experiment" with tax reductions, cutting corporate taxes and then examining how FDI responds to tax cuts. Alternatively, governments could learn from the tax experiences of others by observing how FDI responds to tax reductions in other countries (see Volden, Ting and Carpenter, 2008) . Unfortunately for governments, the volatility of FDI flows makes a simple before and after tax cut comparison of FDI problematic even for well-trained scholars. As highlighted above, there is considerable disagreement on the relationship between taxes and FDI in the academic community. As a result, there is limited ability for "learning by doing" or simply observing the tax policy reforms and FDI responses in other countries. Our model focuses on learning from the tax policy decisions of other countries, allowing governments to observe policy changes by other governments before making their own tax policy decisions.
In the following section we outline a model of social learning from the tax policy choices of other governments, not the response of FDI to taxation. Assuming imperfect information, we construct a learning model that is distinguishable from existing models of tax competition. We believe that our model further contributes to our understanding of tax policy diffusion and has numerous other applications outside of political science.
Theory
In this paper we focus on the diffusion of tax policy across OECD countries. Diffusion theory has experienced a revival in recent years in political science, as evidenced by a growing number of articles, and has been usefully employed in a number of different contexts to understand the process by which ideas, practices and policies make their way across local, state and national boundaries (e.g. Baybeck, 1990, 2005; Boehmke and Witmer, 2004; Quinn and Toyoda, 2007; Elkins and Simmons, 2005; Shipan and Volden, 2006; Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006; Volden, 2006; Volden, Ting and Carpenter, 2008) . Here, we combine two until now separate approaches to suggest a new mechanism by which diffusion can occur. The first part of our theoretical approach is rooted in the social learning strand of diffusion theory. The second part is taken from the theoretical work on the usefulness of biased advice (Calvert, 1985) . From the combination of these two approaches emerges an innovative theory of diffusion that yields interesting new and plausible predictions, which we test with cross-national data on corporate tax cuts.
We begin by discussing the two components of our theoretical approach and then explain how these two approaches can be combined to further our understanding of national (tax) policymaking.
The first approach goes under various names, but social learning is probably the most widely used and most descriptive among them. Common to all social learning approaches is the idea of "pure informational externalities" (Gale, 1996) . This means that individuals can learn from each other's behavior, but their payoffs are not affected by the actions of the other individuals. For instance, to quote one commonly cited example, if an individual decides between two restaurants on the basis of how many people wait in line at the restaurant, then the people waiting in front of the more popular restaurant provide some information to the undecided individual, presumably without affecting the individual's ability to enjoy a good meal at that restaurant if he chooses to go there (see for instance Banerjee, 1992) . 14 In our context, tax policy changes in one country may not directly influence the level of FDI inflows into another country, but they can provide information on the relationship between taxes and FDI inflows.
Here, we focus on a particular class of social learning models that has been referred to as cascade or herding models. 15 In the typical cascade model individuals receive a private signal, for instance on the quality of a particular restaurant, and then are presented with a binary choice, i.e. which of two restaurants to go to (e.g. Banerjee, 1992; Welch, 1992, 1998 ).
In the most basic version of the model, individuals choose sequentially, with the order determined exogenously. The model generates two key findings. First, individuals take into consideration the actions of earlier individuals. Second, the use of information tends to be inefficient. The first point is rather obvious. The second point, however, requires additional elaboration.
Why would the use of information be inefficient? The reason is that very early on in the sequence, individuals will start disregarding their personal information in favor of the information 14 We say "presumably," because one could imagine that long wait times, rushed service and possibly lower meal quality because of an overwhelmed cooking staff might in fact influence the individual's ability to enjoy the food at the more popular restaurant. At least for now, though, we assume away these complicating factors.
15 Hereafter, we refer to them simply as cascade models.
conveyed by the actions of individuals earlier in the sequence. For instance, if the third person, who considers whether to go to restaurant A or B, decides to go against her private signal and join the first two individuals at restaurant A, then the fourth individual is in the same position as the third individual, having learned nothing new from the action of the third individual. 16 This theoretical approach can be used to explain market bubbles and even provide insights into fashion fads. 17 We apply the general idea of cascade models to the question of how national governments make tax policy decisions in a globalized world. We believe that the basic dynamic of cascade models applies to national governments' tax decisions, but with additional twists, some of which have been discussed in the existing literature and one of which, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been considered in the context of cascade models. As a starting point, take the social learning model due to Lohmann (1994) . She applies a variation of the cascade model to the study of the East German revolution in 1989.
What sets Lohmann's approach apart from earlier cascade models is her focus on the ideology of the demonstrators. She suggests that the Leipzig demonstrations against the East German regime were actually successful at disseminating information about the East German regime, and that this success, in great part, has to be attributed to the turnout of ideological moderates (those who were neither particularly critical nor particularly sympathetic to the communist regime). The logic underlying this conclusion is that the participation of moderates in the demonstrations sent a signal to potential future participants that the demonstrations were not just a gathering of the ideological fringes, but rather a legitimate form of protest against an ill-behaving regime. Lohmann goes beyond previous cascade models by saying that it is not just important how many people show up, but also who shows up. 18 16 It should now be clear why this behavior is sometimes also referred to as herding. 17 We believe that these models are the only explanation for 1980s fashion.
18 In a sense, including the notion of ideology in the model allows for what Banerjee (1992) has referred to as invertibility, which means that individuals later in the sequence can, at least partially, infer the signals received by early movers. While Banerjee claims that invertibility eliminates herd externalities, we believe that they would only be completely eliminated if invertibility were perfect, which in Lohmann's story as well as in our story is not the case.
We believe that this notion of ideology, generally speaking, is crucial for understanding national governments' tax policy decisions. However, we depart from Lohmann's model in one important respect: We argue that it is not so-called moderates, as in the context of social movements, but "opposing extremists" that are crucial to social learning in international politics. This is where the second part of our theoretical approach comes into play: Randall Calvert's theory of biased advisors (Calvert, 1985) . Calvert formally models a situation where a decision maker is seeking advice from an expert. Using a straightforward expected utility model, he shows that if a decision maker is strongly favoring a particular policy, then he is better off seeking advice from a biased advisor that has the same predisposition than seeking advice from an objective advisor (not to speak of an adviser biased in the opposite direction). The logic underlying this initially counterintuitive result is that the objective advisor is less likely to make the decision maker change his mind (because of the decision maker's previous predisposition), while advice from a biased advisor can have an impact:
The biased advisor, who has the same ideological predisposition as the decision maker, would only suggest a policy contrary to that predisposition, if he thought that the policy was superior to the alternative(s).
While Calvert's model is about the relationship between a policy maker and an advisor, we are concerned with policy diffusion across governments. However, Calvert's model still has clear implications for diffusion in international politics. 19 We show that one national government can, at least under certain circumstances, infer information about another government's domestic policymaking process and use that information to devise its own policy. Take the example of a left government that adopts a conservative policy. Other governments, both left and right, who observe 19 We should note that while there are important similarities between our model and that of Calvert, the reader should know that Calvert's model focuses on how individuals process information given their own biases and the information biases of their advisors. Our model, while similar in intuition, focuses on actors with diverging partisan preferences for tax policy cuts. We believe that the implications of using either information biases (say towards tax cuts) or preferences (for tax cuts) would be similar. However, we prefer to focus on diverging preferences over tax policy, as it seems more realistic in our context and better fits into the existing work on the political economy of corporate taxation. the first government, can infer from this that the left government must have obtained new and credible information. Why else would the left government have changed its policy stance? Of course, the same story could be told about a right government adopting a liberal policy.
In sum, we argue that Calvert's biased adviser model has implications for international politics, in that governments who reverse long-held policy positions facilitate social learning and diffusion across countries. In the cascade literature, such governments would be referred to as fashion leaders.
What is interesting about this model is that by adding an international level to Calvert's biased advisor story, Calvert's result is expanded (assuming that his logic applies to the domestic level).
Combining the cascade model with the biased advisor model (in relation to domestic policymaking) and applying the modified theory to our question about national governments' tax policy positions yields the following story line. When it comes to cutting taxes in general and corporate taxes in particular, right governments are predisposed to a policy of lowering taxes, while left governments are predisposed to maintaining or even increasing existing tax levels. Given the uncertain role of corporate taxes in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), both right and left governments would like to learn from the behavior of other governments about the feasibility of cutting corporate taxes in attracting FDI, i.e. about the elasticity of FDI to corporate taxes.
While very little is learned about capital elasticity from tax cuts by right governments, tax cuts by left governments provide a credible signal that capital responds to tax policy cuts. 20 This conclusion stems from the following facts: Tax cuts are very costly for left governments, whose core constituencies oppose them, and politically advantageous for right governments, whose core constituencies are in support of tax cuts and smaller government.
The somewhat counterintuitive conclusion here is that left governments lead the way on tax cuts. 21 Moreover, this model yields the following important empirical prediction: In line with the 20 On the issue of credibility in cascade models, see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) .
See also the discussion of the legitimation concept from sociological organization theory in Lieberman and Asaba (2006) . 21 And, by extension of the argument, right governments should lead the way on tax increases.
Here, however, we are primarily concerned with the issue of tax cuts, not least because of the extremely rare occurrence of tax increases. standard logic of cascade/herding models, the larger the number of left governments cutting taxes, the stronger the herding effects, in that the dynamic is more difficult to reverse (even if herding is based on incorrect information). The underlying logic of this key empirical prediction will be further developed in the following paragraphs where we outline the mathematical model.
The inefficient use of information clearly is still an issue in this context. But in our twolevel social learning model in which domestic governments rely on biased advice as well as in the Lohmann (1994) model, this seems to be far less of a problem, since presumably the accuracy of the left government's signal is higher than for the average right government. 22 The combination of the biased advisor story and the social learning model yields some interesting dynamics that we are now going to explore in more detail. 23 At the core of the model is the notion that governments are uncertain about the impact of corporate tax cuts on investment. Specifically, national governments have incomplete information about the elasticity of capital to taxes. If capital is inelastic to changes in the corporate tax rate, then national governments do not have an incentive to cut taxes and might even consider raising taxes. The reason for this type of scenario might be that investors are more concerned with existing infrastructure, secure property rights and easy access to neighboring markets rather than the tax rate. If, however, capital is highly elastic to taxes, then even small changes in the tax rate can lead investors to locate in or migrate from a particular country. While governments might have a general sense of the elasticity of capital to taxes, a substantial amount of uncertainty remains, not least because investors are likely to carefully guard the information about their sensitivity to tax rate changes.
In the model, there are two types of governments, right governments and left governments.
Governments have to decide whether to cut taxes or not, considering that capital elasticity to taxes is either higher or unchanged. When θ, the state of nature indicating capital elasticity, is equal to 1, then there has been an increase in capital elasticity. When θ = 0, then capital elasticity is 22 On signal accuracy, see Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) . 23 The social learning part of the model closely follows the standard cascade model developed in Chamley (2004) . However, as we explain below, we add several assumptions to the basic model to make it conform to our theoretical story.
unchanged. Both types of governments, left and right, have the opportunity, when called upon, to take action, by either cuting the corporate tax rate, x = 1, or maintaining the current corporate tax rate, x = 0. The order in which governments set policy is determined exogenously, and governments are ordered by the periods in which they are called upon to act. 24 Therefore, government t gets to decide on a course of action in period t.
When governments are called upon to act, they receive a privately observed signal that provides probabilistic information on the elasticity of capital. The core of this model, as with any social learning model, concerns the evolution of beliefs about the state of nature. When agents are called upon to act, they combine, via Bayesian updating, the public knowledge about the probabilility of increased capital elasticity, i.e. θ = 1, with their private knowledge, the source of which is the government's private signal. Specifically, in each period, the public belief is updated by the following formula. Since there are only two possible states of nature, we follow the convention in the literature and express the public belief, λ in Equation 1, as the loglikelihood ratio of the two possible states of nature.
In words, this formula states that the public belief about capital elasticity at time t+1 is derived by combining the public belief at time t and the information conveyed by the action of government t in time period t. The updating of the public belief is one crucial place where we diverge from the standard model in the literature. While the literature that we are familiar with would distinguish governments only by their actions, i.e. tax cut or no tax cut, we introduce the idea that it might matter what type of government -left or right -it was that took the action. 25
24 In future iterations, we will allow for the possibility of strategic delay (e.g. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1998; Lohmann, 1994) . Rather than having a pre-defined sequence according to which national governments act, that model would allow governments to strategically delay decisions on tax policy to wait for more accurate information to become available. However, for our current empirical analysis a more refined model is not necessary.
25 The only exception that we know of is the Lohmann (1994) model discussed above. However, as pointed out earlier, her understanding of the importance of type is quite different from ours.
It is important to stress that this process of learning is central to our story. As evidenced by
Equation 1, we model the updating of the public belief by observing the actions (i.e. tax policy) of other actors (i.e. governments). The ratio ν t is to be interpreted as the information conveyed by the actions, specifically in terms of the probability of a particular state of nature given the observed action (the exact proabilities are provided in Table 1 ). We show at the end of this section that under some general conditions tax cuts by left governments lead to more favorable public beliefs about increases in capital elasticity than is the case for tax cuts by right governments. It directly follows that the larger the number of left governments cutting taxes, the stronger the public belief that capital elasticity has increased. The simple intuition is that for public beliefs to change, i.e. To illustrate the predictions of the formal model, we generate a set of simple simulations that show the trajectory of public beliefs under different scenarios. In the following paragraphs, we discuss the process by which we generated the simulations and the corresponding output. The simulations are based on a model with ten governments, five of which are left governments and the 26 With respect to the probabilities in Table 1 , note that we also assume that (i) p L > p L and
27 At this point, we assume away that actions are costly, and we avoid answering the question of why governments decide to cut taxes or not. We invite the reader to consider the possibility that arcane exogenous shocks trigger government action initially. With these simplifying assumptions, our model, by way of Equation 1 and Table 1, shows that clustered tax cuts by left governments propel the public belief about increased capital elasticity more quickly above an arbitrary threshold than clustered tax cuts by right governments. We further elaborate on this finding in subsequent paragraphs.
other five right governments. In a first step, we randomly generated the following sequence of those ten governments.
We then set the loglikelihood ratio of the initial public belief, λ 0 , equal to zero, which corresponds to a starting public belief of µ 0 = 0.5. Stated differently, we assume that initially governments are completely uncertain about the effect of taxes on capital investment. We also imposed specific updating probabilities that are consistent with the constraints stated as part of Table 1 .
Specifically, we assume that p L = 0.4, p L = 0.8, p C = 0.49 and p C = 0.51. In words, we assume that (i) a left government that cuts taxes provides a fairly accurate signal that capital elasticity has increased and is unlikely to be associated with constant capital elasticity, and (ii) that the actions of right governments fail to provide accurate information about capital elasticity.
We then used Equation 1 to calculate the evolution of public beliefs under different scenarios.
The lighter lines in the five panels of Figure 1 show the evolution of beliefs for the sequence (L 1 ,
Specifically, in the first panel (lighter line), it is assumed that only R 1 cuts taxes (c on the x-axis), with all of the other governments, both left and right, opting not to cut taxes (n on the x-axis). In the second panel (again lighter line and going clockwise), R 1 and R 2 are the only governments to cut taxes. This pattern continues until, in the fifth panel, all right governments are assumed to cut taxes, but none of the left governments.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
Next, we took the sequence ( (
Comparing the dark and lighter lines, we can see that increasing the number of right governments cutting taxes (lighter lines) only minimally increases the public belief that capital is elastic (from 0.027 in the first panel to 0.037 in the last panel). However, increasing the number of left governments cutting taxes (dark lines) greatly increases the public belief that capital is elastic (from 0.13 in the first panel to 0.99 in the last panel). Given that the public belief is a crucial aspect of governmental policy-making in our model, these simulations provide clear evidence that the more left governments cut taxes, the more likely it is that other governments will be convinced to cut taxes themselves. While there is also an upward trend in the public beliefs as more right governments cut taxes, the effect is fairly limited and pales in comparison to the effect of tax cuts by left governments. Consequently, the key hypotheses that we are going to empirically test in subsequent sections are:
The more left governments cut taxes, the more likely other governments, both left and right, are to cut their own tax rates.
H2:
The number of right governments cutting taxes has no effect on tax policy decisions of other governments, both left and right.
Empirical Research Design, Data and Methodology
Following Hypothesis 1 and 2, we explicitly test for partisan differences in learning by introducing measures of tax cuts by both left and right governments. Thus, our interest is in exploring whether tax cuts by right or left governments trigger tax cuts by other governments. We hypothesize, in accordance with the predictions generated at the end of Section 3, that learning takes place when left governments cut taxes. We stress that this pattern of diffusion is inconsistent with existing arguments about tax policy competition.
Our research design strategy is to focus on corporate tax policy cuts in the OECD to test our theory. 28 Although we control for a number of domestic-level factors that affect corporate tax policy, our focus is on exploring how tax policy cuts in other OECD countries influence a country's tax policy decisions.
[ Figure 2 about We use two data sets to test our theoretical model. The first is the data set used by Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) who take corporate tax rate changes as the dependent variable. While we believe that these rate changes are important to multinationals making investment decisions, the focus of most of the social science literature is on the tax policy reforms of governments. Despite the fact that rate changes and policy reforms may seem equivalent, tax policy reforms are made when the legislature passes a corresponding law, while rates changes occur when these rates are applied to corporate taxes.
Using a number of data sources, we searched for announced tax policy reforms in our sample of OECD countries from 1980-2000. 29 We provide details on the data coding in a supplemental appendix and include the data and replication materials on the authors' websites. We coded major tax policy cuts as announced cuts to the maximum statutory marginal corporate tax rate.
While this may miss a number of other potential tax policy cuts, such as changes in depreciation schedules, most of the major tax policy reforms in the OECD have been coupled with reductions in the statutory tax rate. We argue that the actual reforms are the signals that other countries 29 These include Lexis-Nexis searches of major English language newspapers and data from Pechman (1988), Boskin and McLure, Jr. (1990) , Haufler (2001) and OECD (2004) .
observe. Thus, we differentiate between the yearly change in the tax rate and policy change. and multiple incorrect codings of the Canadian tax cut (rather than one law change in 2000, one would code five legislative changes). Thus there are major differences between when a tax rate comes into effect and when a tax policy reform is passed.
[ Table 2 about here.]
In Table 2 we present the descriptive data on the timing of tax policy cuts that we coded and observed rate changes from the Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) Of the 360 total cases in the data set, there are a total of 298 agreements in coding and 65 cases of disagreement. This error rate of 18% is not only high by most data coding standards, but it is especially striking in that the cases of agreement are mostly due to the rarity of tax policy cuts.
In 284 cases, both data sets find no evidence of tax policy cuts. Tax policy cuts, although less extreme than war or democratization, are pretty rare events. In all three cases, coding a data set of all zeros would yield fairly low overall error rates. In our case, a data set of all zeros (no policy change) would be more accurate than the policy changes implied by the Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) rate changes (89% accuracy vs. 83% accuracy).
Comparing our data on observed tax policy cuts and tax rate changes, there are only 14 cases of agreement (3.9% of the cases). We find 39 cases of Type I error, where the rate change data indicates tax policy cuts, yet we find no evidence of an actual tax law being enacted. We also find 26 cases of Type II error, where our data indicates a major tax policy reform, yet there is no rate change in the Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) data set. Put another way, in the Basinger and
Hallerberg data, roughly 15% of the observations are tax policy cuts. In our data we find evidence of tax cuts in only 11% of the observations, with little overlap with their data.
Within this sea of numbers on the coding accuracy, we believe that one set of descriptive statistics tells most of the story. Of the 53 tax rate changes in the Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) data, 73% of the cases are not associated with an actual tax policy reform. One may quibble that these errors could be associated with assuming that a tax rate cut in year t, say 1990, should be associated with a tax policy cut in year t (also 1990) . But what if we assumed that a rate change in t (1990) was associated with a tax policy cut in t − 1 (1989)? Using rate changes in year t and assuming that these were caused by legislative change in year t − 1, we still find very high error rates of over 16% and only 16 cases of correctly coded tax policy reform. To put it bluntly, no matter what lag structure one uses, if one assumed that a single tax rate change was associated with a single tax policy reform, one would be wrong 70% of the time!
It is important to stress that we do not dispute the quality of the underlying tax data used by Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) . Theirs is high-quality data that has been used by numerous scholars, and it provides important information on the rates of corporate taxation faced by firms operating in a particular country in a given year. 31 In our empirical analysis we use both sets of data, yet we stress that if one is seeking to explain tax policy choice by governments, changes in corporate tax rates are not only rough estimates of when policy is enacted, but these estimates will tend to be wrong. In models of learning and competition that make arguments about temporal patterns, we believe that identifying the date of the change is necessary to assure accuracy of the empirical analysis.
In our empirical analysis we rely on two types of models. In the first set of models we estimate the determinants of tax rate changes. We replicate the work of Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) , using a standard OLS model with panel-corrected standard errors. Our dependent variable is the change in the corporate tax rate (Change in Central Tax Rate). Our key independent variable is our constructed measure of corporate tax policy cuts in the n − 1 other countries (World Tax Law Changes). 32 We believe these models provide an excellent comparison to existing work on the political economy of corporate tax policy. The model takes the following form.
. . , 299 and j = 1, . . . , 20
In the second set of models we focus solely on our data collected on tax policy cuts and do not 31 One other important distinction is that we are focusing on the maximum statutory marginal corporate tax rate. We argue that this rate serves as a clear signal of tax policy changes and is easily observed by other governments. Of course, other forms of national income, sales and valueadded taxation, along with subnational taxation (at the state and local level), can affect firms' investment decisions. Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) , for example, study tax competition using three different types of taxation that affect investment decisions. Again, we believe their data is an excellent source for exploring the tax burden and investment decisions of firms. However, since our focus is on tax policy learning across governments, the maximum statutory marginal corporate tax rate, being the most visible tax policy instrument, is the most appropriate measure in this context. use data on tax rates. We estimate the probability of tax law changes in two standard time-series cross-sectional logit models of the following form.
We also estimate two hierarchical models (also referred to as multi-level or mixed-effect models), in which we allow the intercept to randomly vary across countries. We believe that a hierarchical model is the most appropriate one in this context, given (i) the hierarchical structure of our data and (ii) the built-in ability of this model to test for rather than assume the degree of country-level variance beyond that accounted for by the fixed effects. 33
The key independent variables are the government's partisanship (Partisanship) as measured by Laver and Hunt (1992) and coded by Tsebelis and the ideological distance between veto players (Ideological Distance). 34 Partisanship is coded on a 0-1 continuum, where left governments (coded as 0) are more likely to resist corporate tax cuts due to the higher domestic costs associated with this policy change. Ideological Distance is the distance between veto players, where governments with large ideological distances between veto players will have difficulty passing tax policy reforms. Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) also include the past corporate tax rate (Tax Rate (t − 1)), where countries with higher rates are more likely to respond to tax policy competition. They also use a number of other control variables, including Capital Controls, Inflation Rate and economic Growth Rate, all of which are lagged by one year. We provide details on these variables in Table 3 .
33 While models without country fixed effects pool all countries indiscriminately and models with country fixed effects assume that no similarities exist across countries (i.e., no pooling), hierarchical models do not make any a priori assumption about pooling, but rather estimate the amount of pooling from the data.
34 http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tsebelis/veto players data.
[ Table 3 
Results
We present the empirical results from the replication of Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) in Model 1 of Table 4 . 36 We also test Basinger and Hallerberg's model of tax rate change by substituting their variable for tax competition, Competitor Taxation Change, with our own measure of tax policy cuts. Our measure, World Tax Law Changes, is the number of tax policy cuts in the other n − 1 countries in year t − 1. The intuition for both models is that countries are responding to tax policy cuts in other countries. 37 We expect the coefficient on World Tax Law, Right Tax Law and Left
Tax Law Changes to be positive since tax policy cuts are coded as 1 and no tax policy cuts are coded as 0. In both models tax rate changes and tax policy cuts are associated with tax cuts.
Our control variables are in line with conventional work on the determinants of tax policy cuts. We are more likely to observe tax cuts in years when other countries have low levels of 35 In their paper, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) estimate a number of weights on these variables, including weighting by GDP and levels of capital flows.
36 All of the results in this section were generated in the statistical package R (R Development
Core Team, 2008) . The OLS models with panel-corrected standard errors were estimated using the pcse package (Bailey and Katz, 2007) and the regular logit, the hierarchical logit models and the post-estimation results presented in Figure 3 using the Zelig package (Bailey and Alimadhi, 2007; Lau, 2007a,b, 2008) .
37 The coefficient on the variable Competitor Taxation Change is positive since tax policy cuts in other countries are coded as negative changes (a reduction from 40% to 30% is coded as −10%).
restrictions on flows of international capital. Also, high tax countries and countries with high levels of inflation are more likely to reform corporate taxes. Model 1 in Table 4 replicates the work of Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) , using the average corporate tax rate reduction of the n − 1 other countries (Competitor Taxation Change) as the independent variable, and Model 2 uses our variable counting the number of tax policy reforms in the n − 1 other countries (World Tax Law Changes). Both models show that tax changes, whether measured as rate reductions or tax policy cuts, are associated with rate reductions in other countries.
[ Table 4 The results from this model indicate that tax policy cuts are driven by the tax policy cuts of left governments. The negative coefficient on Left Tax Law Changes indicates that a tax policy cut by a left government leads to a reduction in the corporate tax rates of the n − 1 other countries. Our results are robust to changes in the lag structure. Finally, when we do not separate left and right governments using a dichotomous classification and instead weight the tax law changes by the level of partisanship we find strong evidence that tax law changes by left governments (the change in the tax rate weighted by partisanship) lead to tax reductions, while we do not find evidence that large policy changes by right governments lead to tax cuts in other countries. 39 We interpret these results as providing strong support for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
One potential criticism of our empirical analysis is that "left governments" cutting taxes may be significantly different from "right governments" choosing to cut taxes. For example, while most left governments are loath to cut corporate taxes, a small set of left governments may see themselves 38 For simplicity we code right governments ≤ 0.5 on the partisanship measure as left and > 0.5 as right.
39 The level of partisanship is a continuous variable from 0 (left) to 1 (right). We weight left tax cuts by the formula ((1-partisanship) × tax law change) and right tax cuts by (partisanship × tax law change).
as very competitive in attracting foreign direct investment. Thus, our coding of left tax policy cuts could be proxying for effectiveness in attracting international capital.
We explored if there were significant differences between country-years when left governments enact tax reforms and (i) the rest of the country-years in the sample, and (ii) and right governments that cut taxes. We examined if there were statistically significant differences in the amount of capital attracted by these governments (foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP), the size of the domestic market (log of GDP) and the country's level of development (log of GDP per capita). 40 All of these factors are associated with being a more attractive investment environment.
We found no statistically significant differences between left governments cutting taxes and the rest of the governments in the sample, or between left governments cutting taxes and right governments cutting taxes. We are confident that our variable counting the number of left governments cutting taxes is not proxying for competitive governments cutting taxes.
[ Table 5 about here.]
In Table 5 we present the results of two logit models using the passage of a tax policy cuts as the dependent variable. In Models 4 and 5 we present a logit of tax policy cuts with country dummy variables. 41 Note that the coefficient on Left Tax Law Changes were negative in Table 4 (cuts by left governments lead to reductions in tax rates) while in this set of regressions we expect a positive coefficient. We expect corporate tax policy cuts in left countries to positively affect other countries' propensity to enact tax policy cuts.
The first model controls for the country-level factors from Table 4 41 The empirical results without the country dummies are similar. We had to exclude dummy variables for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United States due to perfect prediction of success/failure.
(11% of the observations) makes estimation difficult. Yet, we note that our key empirical results on social learning from left governments is robust to different empirical specifications. 42 As in Table   4 , we find that while World Tax Law Changes has a positive and statistically significant effect on the tax policy decisions of governments, these results are entirely driven by the tax policy decisions of left governments.
Our second set of estimates are the result of two hierarchical logit models, in which we regress tax policy cuts on the independent variables described earlier. The hierarchical models do not include country dummies. Rather, country-level variance is accounted for by including a random intercept. 43 The results are given in Table 5 as Models 6 and 7. In Model 6, World Tax Law
Changes serves as the key independent variable. Its sign is in the expected direction and its effect is marginally statistically significant. The more tax law changes occurred in the previous year, the more likely a country is to cut its taxes. The only other (marginally) significant variable is Tax Rate (t − 1), which has the expected positive sign.
In Given the large number of zeros in the dependent variable we also estimated rare events logit models (see King and Zeng, 1999a,b) . Software used to calculate the rare events logistic regression is from Tomz, King and Zeng (1999) . Our empirical results are similar. We will make the results available upon request.
43 In mixed-effects models, all of the variables except for the random effects are referred to as fixed effects.
44 By dividing the standard deviation of the country-level errors by 4, one gets ± the percent by that there is quite a large degree of pooling, suggesting that it is not necessary to include country fixed effects. 45
The substantive impact of tax policy cuts by left governments is quite large. In Figure 3 , we present post-estimation results generated with the R package Zelig. Specifically, Figure 3 shows the impact a tax policy cut by a left government has on countries' probabilities to institute tax policy cuts. For the simulations, on which the results in Figure 3 are based, we set all of the variables, except for Right Tax Law Changes and Left Tax Law Changes, at their means. The solid line in Figure 3 represents a situation in which neither a left nor a right government changes its tax laws.
[ Figure 3 about here.]
In our sample of OECD tax policy cuts, only 11% of the country-year observations are tax policy cuts. From our simulations, we find that the impact of this one tax law change by a left government is quite substantial. During years when there were no tax law changes in the previous year, the expected probability of a tax law change is 8%. When a single left government chooses to cut tax policy in year t, the probability of each individual country implementing a tax policy cut in year t + 1 jumps to 14%, an increase of 75%. While major tax policy cuts are still relatively uncommon, we find considerable evidence of learning consistent with our theory.
Conclusion
In this paper we directly address the growing political science literature on diffusion. Our insight is that there are a number of mechanisms that can lead to spatial or temporal clustering of policy which countries differ on the probability scale beyond the differences explained by the fixed effects (Gelman and Hill, 2007, p. 304) . In the both of the hierarchical logit models, that number is ± 0.00056%. This supports the argument that, given strong globalization effects, countries, aside from differences in their formal political processes, tend to be very similar in the area of tax policy making. 45 We also estimated a generalized linear mixed model using maximum likelihood (Zelig uses penalized quasi-likelihood). The substantive results are the same across the models. We will make the results available upon request. We test our model using an existing data set of tax rate changes from Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) and an author-constructed data set of tax policy cuts in twenty OECD countries from 1980-2000. Our empirical analysis suggests that, contrary to existing models of tax policy competition, the diffusion of tax cuts is most likely triggered by left governments cutting taxes. We believe that these empirical results provide an important contribution to the understanding of diffusion of tax policy and help inform some public policy debates on tax competition within the OECD.
We also believe that our theory and empirical analysis can provide new insights into both comparative tax policy and broader literatures in political science and economics. In terms of comparative tax policy, we stress that the temporal clustering of tax policy cuts in the OECD could be consistent with a number of models of learning, competition or diffusion. Our empirical evidence on the role of tax policy cuts by left governments as the driving force for corporate tax policy diffusion is inconsistent with existing theories of tax policy competition. Social learning, not competition for capital, explains patterns of corporate tax cuts across countries. Unfortunately, as pointed out in our theory section, this type of social learning can be inefficient. Governments may be learning from the tax policy cuts of left governments, yet this does not mean that corporate tax policy cuts are necessarily good public policy.
We believe that this project also provides insights into a number of different phenomena by combining the biased advisor work of Calvert (1985) with other theories of social learning. We believe that learning from "opposition extremists" is an alternative mechanism that has been largely unexplored in political science. Our theory not only adds a new explanation to the already dense research on diffusion, but it also allows for an identification strategy that makes it possible to differentiate learning from alternative theories of diffusion. 
